

**ENGAGED LEADERSHIP: A METHOD FOR LINKING THE PROFESSIONAL ETHIC AND  
BATTLEFIELD BEHAVIORS**

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The ethical behavior of Soldiers on the battlefield is paramount, especially in counterinsurgency and stability operations where the support of the local populace is vital to the success of the mission. Despite their rarity, a few ethical lapses of Soldiers serving at the lowest tactical echelons can be detrimental to the strategic mission. We continue to see how one incident by an individual Soldier or small group of Soldiers can set back the success of an entire unit, even a coalition. This came to the forefront during the war in Iraq with the events of Abu Ghraib and Haditha.<sup>1,2</sup> Recently, similar events were reported in Afghanistan with five members of an Army Stryker brigade charged with the premeditated murder of three Afghan civilians.<sup>3</sup> These events resurrected memories of Vietnam where Soldier misconduct was considered more prevalent, marked not only by major events such as the My Lai Massacre, but by frequent drug use, fragging of unit leaders, and poor treatment of non-combatants.<sup>4</sup> These events in Iraq suddenly revived a debate over the professional ethic of our Soldiers calling into question whether these events represented isolated incidents or an ethical culture problem in our present armed forces. A culture problem might indicate a failure of initiatives introduced after Vietnam to help counter the problems of the “Hollow Army” including the extension of professional status to non-commissioned officers and the institution of the Army Values.<sup>5</sup>

On the surface, these events appear to represent a few isolated incidents. However, the present conditions that exist within our Army including repetitive combat deployments provide opportunities for future lapses to occur. Preventing ethical lapses in the face of these conditions requires a change in unit culture in which fellow members (Soldiers) hold each other accountable to proper standards of conduct and performance. This culture change can only occur through direct leader involvement via *Engaged Leadership*, which leads to modeling of proper behavior and discouragement and correction of inappropriate actions. This paper will provide an overview of the factors that lead to Soldier misconduct, review recent analyses of the ethical climate in Iraq, present a course of action (COA) one division took to address battlefield

ethics, and finally, discuss the role of *Engaged Leadership* in improving and enhancing Soldier battlefield ethical performance.

## MISCONDUCT BEHAVIORS IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

During deployments, Soldiers face a myriad of physical and mental stressors. Physical stressors fall into two categories, environmental and physical. Environmental stressors include the harsh, varying climates, difficult terrain, constant noise, and continuous threat of physical harm while psychological stressors involve sleep deprivation, fatigue, and illness/injury. Mental stressors include dealing with organizational dynamics, information flow, performing duties outside one's normal area of concentration, and being separated from friends, family, and support groups. These factors as a whole are termed combat and operational stressors. Soldiers respond to these stressors along a continuum of physical and psychological adaptation that ranges from adaptive to maladaptive responses (Figure 1).<sup>6</sup> While adaptive responses lead to increased cohesion, mission effectiveness, and heroic acts, maladaptive responses take the form of either misconduct behaviors or combat operational stress reactions.

Combat operational stress reactions are defined as “expected, predictable, emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or behavioral reactions of Soldiers who have been exposed to stressful events in combat or military operations other than war” and include physical, emotional, cognitive and behavioral responses.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, misconduct behaviors include a myriad of behaviors that range from shirking or malingering and alcohol use in theater to significant violations of the Laws of Land Warfare.<sup>8</sup> Of key interest in stability operations are the Soldiers' interactions with non-combatants.

Current military doctrine and research is unclear as to all of the factors that influence Soldiers towards misconduct behaviors during interactions with non-combatants. Some, such as Jonathan Shay have argued that Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) leads to misconduct behaviors.<sup>9</sup> However, more recent research indicates that the volume of combat exposures

rather than the presence or absence of PTSD is the most influential factor on a Soldier's attitudes and behaviors towards non-combatants.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, low levels of training and poor unit discipline are key indicators for misconduct behaviors.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, leaders must be aware of the prior experiences of their Soldiers and create a climate that not only demands Soldiers act appropriately, but one which ensures all Soldiers are willing to hold other unit members accountable for their conduct as well.

## ETHICAL CLIMATE IN IRAQ

In 2006, the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander, at that time GEN Casey, requested an assessment of the ethical culture of his force. Thus, for the first time ethical issues were included in the annual iteration of the Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) Soldier Well-Being survey of deployed United States Soldiers in Iraq. This represented the first systematic assessment of battlefield ethics in a combat environment since World War II. The assessment specifically addressed Soldier misconduct behavior, attitude towards battlefield ethical issues, and the adequacy of battlefield ethical training for preparing Soldiers to conduct combat operations in Iraq.

While the results showed that there were not widespread issues to the extreme of the incidents previously mentioned, the findings did show that less than 50% of Soldiers were willing to report a member of their unit for ethical violations.<sup>12</sup> Somewhat alarming, it also cited that nearly 10% of Soldiers reported damaging a non-combatant's personal property or hitting/kicking non-combatants when it was not necessary.<sup>13</sup> (Table 1) Additionally, the findings noted that Soldiers with higher levels of combat exposure reported increased rates of non-combatant mistreatment.<sup>14</sup> These findings were revalidated in the next iteration of the MHAT in 2007.<sup>15</sup> This was concerning as it indicated that the conditions presented increased vulnerability to further ethical breaches. These findings led to a recommendation for the development of a Battlefield Ethics training program.<sup>16</sup>

## MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION-CENTER BATTLEFIELD ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM

The MHAT findings prompted the Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) Commanding General, then MG Rick Lynch, to develop and implement a COA involving a Battlefield Ethics training program for all Soldiers under his command. The MND-C staff, in conjunction with the US Army Judge Advocate General Center and School, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), and several civilian experts in ethics, built a training program based upon the Laws of War and Army Values.<sup>17,18</sup> They chose a chain teaching instructional format and model in which senior leaders taught their immediate subordinates using a training disk that included video vignettes from popular movies to highlight the main lesson objectives. The subordinate leaders in turn taught their subordinate leaders and Soldiers to ensure the training filtered down through all levels of military personnel to the lowest echelon.

Training sessions were conducted in small groups among teams, squads, and platoons to promote discussion amongst those Soldiers who served in combat together. To ensure that the training was standardized throughout the organization, unit leaders were provided with a script which accompanied the training program and included a set of key questions and discussion points for each vignette. An overview of the training program is provided in Figure 1.<sup>19</sup> The training was initiated in December 2007 and all units reported training complete by mid-January 2008.<sup>20</sup>

A recent scientific review of the effectiveness of this training program noted significant reductions in Soldier mistreatment of non-combatants coinciding with significant improvement in the ethical attitudes of Soldiers. While the video clips and material provided a novel technique to assist leaders with framing the context of the discussion, retaining Soldiers' attention, and focusing them on the key training concepts, the authors concluded that the greatest impact of the program came from the chain teaching format. They determined that this "provided a method for leaders to engage their subordinates (*Engaged Leadership*) so that Soldiers were

hearing from their own leaders how they were expected to respond to ethically challenging situations and allowed for direct discussion of mission-relevant situations.”<sup>21</sup>

## ENGAGED LEADERSHIP

In his recent book, *Engaged Leadership*, Clint Swindall noted that “*Engaged Leadership*” is about developing employees who are committed to the organization and its outcomes including the methods and means used to achieve those outcomes. He defines three key tenets for *Engaged Leadership*: Directional Leadership (building a consensus for the vision), Motivational Leadership (inspiring people to pursue the vision), and Organizational Leadership (developing the team to realize the vision).<sup>22</sup> These tenets are not new and it can be argued that they are already ingredients in our current military system with leaders who have the staff and positional power to build a consensus, inspire their Soldiers, and direct them towards the commander’s intent and end state. However, for leaders to be effectively engaged, they need to focus on certain key competencies, they are: they must know their Soldiers, be effective communicators, and be directly involved with their subordinates. It is important to note that these competencies closely mirror three of the key tenets of the “Commander’s Role” in Mission Command which includes the need to *understand* your Soldier, *describe* clearly the mission, the Soldier’s role and the leader’s expectations, and *direct* Soldier actions on the battlefield.<sup>23</sup> As such, these principles are not just about how the commander imposes his will on the enemy and synchronizes his unit’s efforts, but also how he controls his unit and set the conditions for achieving the desired end state.(Figure 3)

### *Engaged Leaders Know Their Soldiers*

Effective *engaged leaders* must build mutual trust. This is accomplished by determining the needs and motives of their subordinates and understanding how events and life factors are impacting their Soldiers. Leaders need to not only know what prior exposures and combat

experiences their Soldiers have faced and how that might influence the Soldier's behavior, but also understand what key events or stressors are occurring in their lives that might distract their attention or impact decisions they make. While combat exposures can be significant events, recent studies have shown that the most frequent source of combat operational stress reactions are events that are happening back on the home front.<sup>24</sup>

Leaders need to take the time to get to know their Soldiers before a deployment. They must learn about their Soldier's families, their friends, key events in their lives, their motivations for joining the military, and their plans, goals, and aspirations, not only for their military career, but for life. The majority of Soldiers will openly share this knowledge but it can be difficult for some as they will not be comfortable openly sharing details about their life outside of work, especially those who are struggling. Studies have shown that there are significant stigmas about asking for help in the military culture with the largest barriers being concerns that their leader or supervisor might have less confidence in them or treat them differently if they are having problems.<sup>25</sup> The rates of stigma more than doubled in those who did have ongoing problems.<sup>26</sup> Leaders must work to counter this perception.

Leaders must understand the learning styles and effective motivational methods for each Soldier to effectively overcome the barriers or stigmas associated with seeking help with problems. There is no one size fits all technique and leaders must adapt their approach for each Soldier. To be effective in this, leaders should, when available, take the time not only to get to know the Soldier but those around them, their family, friends, and key individuals who influence the Soldier. These types of interactions can be both informal and formal, but need to be enduring throughout the leader-subordinate relationship and should be viewed just as common place.

By making these types of interactions common place, it can help overcome the potential lack of trust that a Soldier might have with the leader including concerns about the leader's motivation. If questions about family, friends, and life events are infrequent then Soldiers will



view them as probing and be less trusting. However if questions like these are part of the climate from the moment that they enter the unit, then they become part of the culture and will yield to a higher level of understanding about each other. Furthermore, if leaders possess this level of knowledge two echelons deep on all of their personnel, then they will have a higher level of awareness and understanding about how to effectively motivate, employ, and lead the unit.

One general officer noted that building trust starts with how you welcome a Soldier to a unit. He discussed how as a Brigade and Division Commander he met with all newcomers to welcome them to the unit and outline his expectations for the unit. During these sessions, he addressed the importance of seeking assistance and emphasized asking for help was a sign of strength not weakness. Furthermore, he noted that when serving as a direct level or small unit leader, he frequently called the spouse and parents of each new Soldier that arrived to his unit to thank them for the trust that they were emplacing in him and the Army to care for their Soldier.<sup>27</sup>

These interactions had several positive effects. First, they immediately sent a message to the Soldier that they are important to the unit and provided the Commander with a level of awareness, insight, and understanding about the Soldier that he was unlikely to get from their initial interview. Secondly, it immediately sent a message to the family that we care about your Soldier and built a bridge for future communication. Lastly, it created a culture and climate in which junior or subordinate leaders saw the value that the commander placed on getting to know the Soldier(s) and created an expectation that all subordinates would do this as well.

As previously mentioned, combat exposures and life events contribute to a Soldier's level of stress which directly leads to their behavioral performance. If the leader has a level of insight and understanding about what is affecting and impacting the Soldier, then they can anticipate potential for adverse issues and situations and intervene early to mitigate and/or ward them off. The MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training educated Soldiers and leaders about these potential negative influences and provided them with information, techniques, and methods for

intervention. Using the chain teaching program, they opened a dialogue between direct level leaders and their subordinates about issues of stress and combat performance. Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of establishing understanding and awareness to help set the conditions for success for the Soldier and prevent the negative outcomes that lead to ethical misconduct on the battlefield.

### *Engaged Leaders Are Effective Communicators*

Effective communication spans the gap between the leader and subordinates. As such, the leader must ensure that their Soldiers know they are valuable and connected members of the organization who understand the standards, values, and expected behaviors in the unit. In return, the leader should seek buy-in from the subordinates. To be an effective engaged communicator, the leader must do three things: be able to show empathy and connect with their Soldier, be able to clearly articulate the vision, direction, and expectations (mission, intent, and end state) to their subordinates, and be able to modify their delivery style to effectively motivate Soldiers.

Showing empathy and connecting with the Soldier is vital throughout this process. Empathy is not sympathy. Rather, it is about reflecting back to the Soldier that you understand their experiences and care about their personal needs and achievement. A study and review of literature conducted by the Center for Creative Leadership noted that empathic leaders were better able to effectively build and maintain relationships and recommended that leaders need to hone their empathy skills through listening, perspective-taking, and compassion.<sup>28</sup> This is especially important in diverse organizations in which subordinates have many different backgrounds and life experiences such as the military. As Stephen Covey noted in his book *Seven Habits for Highly Effective People*, empathic listening allows the leader to appreciate and understand the impact that different life experiences have on how individuals respond to and act

in situations.<sup>29</sup> Empathy shows the sincerity and authenticity which is vital in creating a connection with and gaining a level of understanding about Soldiers.

Beyond establishing the connection is the ability to communicate a clear vision and direction. As previously mentioned, getting to know Soldiers is about building trust and developing an understanding of the Soldier's needs and motives. Leaders who have a strong level of awareness and understanding of their Soldiers can then carefully select their tone, word choice, and message in linking the Soldier's personal motives to the mission and vision of the unit. Creating buy in to the unit's mission, vision, and values is a powerful influencing tool in all stages of the deployment cycle as it strengthens the core of the unit. Dr. Gene Klann noted in his book, *Crisis Leadership*, "during a crisis the leader can leverage a credible vision and value system and use both as a rallying point and as a way to provide stability to employees who are rocked by events."<sup>30</sup> A clearly communicated vision and set of values creates a unit standard that will provide a learned response for how Soldiers should act in times of crisis. These clear expected standards of performance become part of the unit culture and lead to adaptive responses to stress rather than maladaptive ones. Furthermore, they provide Soldiers with internal direction to hold each other accountable to maintain the unit mission and goals.

Leaders must establish the Soldier's commitment to the unit's mission and values through many different methods. In his book *The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership*, John Maxwell noted that individuals first buy in to the leader and then the vision.<sup>31</sup> Unit leaders must use their awareness and understanding of the Soldier to transition their behavior from compliance to the positional power of the supervisor to commitment to the organization and its outcomes. Through the enhanced level of understanding, leaders are able to use rational influence techniques such as rational persuasion and apprising as well as soft tactics to effectively achieve this goal. By converting from a culture of compliance to a culture of commitment, leaders are able to establish cultural norms in which Soldiers will be more apt to hold each other accountable and uphold the standard even when the leader is not present. This is vital in

battlefield situations in which Soldiers may encounter challenging situations where they must make rapid decisions. A clearly communicated vision, level of expected standards and behaviors, and established culture of commitment to the unit vision and its values lead the Soldier to clear expectations of acceptable and appropriate behavior.

Effective communication was a key component of the MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training. The first line supervisor met with his direct subordinates to discuss the issue of battlefield ethics. Rather than sending out a chaplain, lawyer, or senior leader, the individual who knew the Soldier(s) best and had a good understanding and awareness of each Soldier's current levels of stress and life events delivered the training. This proved a more effective approach making the subordinates more receptive to the training. The leader was expected to tailor the dialogue to situations which the unit had encountered enhancing the relevance of the discussion. Soldiers participated in the training with a group of their peers creating an environment where they were more comfortable sharing their experiences and developing a collective level of situational understanding. A result was the Soldiers were able to see the importance of this issue to their leader allowing the leader to use their personal power, rather than positional power, to seek the Soldiers' commitment to a culture of battlefield ethics rather than compliance with a set of rules sent down from above.

### *Engaged Leaders Are Personally Involved*

In the "Commander's Role" in Mission Command, FM 3-0 notes that the commander directs all aspects of the operation through preparing, positioning, ordering, and adjusting personnel.<sup>32</sup> In *Engaged Leadership*, the leader directs through their personal presence and involvement. Leaders personally set and enforce the standards, perform checks and inspections, and remove barriers in order to create the best possible conditions for success.

While leaders will publish their standards, orders, intent, and other expectations, they must first set and enforce the standards through their own actions and example. An *engaged leader*

recognizes that they are always on a platform being watched, so they must show the way for others through their example. They must set the tone for and expectation of the desired values and principles for the unit. Previous sections discussed developing trust and effectively communicating the values, goals, and vision for the organization, but even more influential are the leader's actions. If a leader communicates the desired values in his vision and oral communication but then violates those same values through his own behavior or conduct, then he creates a hypocritical ethical climate that will erode morale and mission effectiveness of the unit. By modeling expected behaviors, this standard will trickle down through the lines of subordinate leaders who will mimic or emulate the actions and behavior of the leader.

An example of this was seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom when a Division Commander wanted to increase the emphasis that his Commanders were placing on addressing Soldiers' mental health concerns. Rather than instructing his commanders to place emphasis on this area, the Commander mentioned briefly how he was focusing on this area for his staff and had his behavioral health provider from his staff travel with him to several engagements with his brigade commanders. The subordinate commanders quickly noticed his emphasis and followed suit, acting in kind without any prompt or verbal instruction from the division commander.<sup>33</sup>

Aside from their personal actions, example, and emphasis, leaders must follow up to ensure the proper tone is set through their direct involvement in performance checks and inspections. Those events, actions, activities, or items that a leader emphasizes through their personal participation, involvement, or emphasis can have significant impact. In 2007, a media story broke about poor living conditions for recovering Wounded Warriors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. This situation resulted in the resignation of the Secretary of the Army and the dismissal of two general officers. During the congressional testimony surrounding this event The Surgeon General of the Army testified that he did not inspect barracks.<sup>34</sup> While it was by no means The Surgeon General's responsibility to inspect barracks, it highlighted that the Soldier living conditions were not a priority in that organization. Leaders are constantly

challenged with a dilemma of priorities. The *engaged leader* must determine the key areas that support the organization's mission and values then ensure that they are being emphasized through performance checks and inspections. One of these areas habitually addressed must be the ethical culture and climate of the unit and anything which impedes this climate

*Engaged leaders* remove all obstacles and barriers by creating the best possible conditions for success. As leaders communicate with their subordinates and motivate them toward their vision and unit end state, they learn of impediments and road blocks that hinder the effectiveness of Soldier and unit performance. This feedback is vital as it allows the leader to engage at various levels to make changes or determine effective workarounds in line with the values of the organization. This level of personal involvement aids direct leadership and allows for establishment and encouragement of ethical practices which helps to prevent the creation or promotion of methods not in line or keeping with the organization's values.

Identifying the obstacles builds from the other two principles of direct leader involvement. Conducting performance checks and inspections, as well as sensing sessions with the staff, aid in recognizing key obstacles. In battlefield ethics this direct leader involvement is key. Ethics must be integrated into mission analysis and the tactical evaluation of results. Leaders must identify the potential situations that units might encounter on the battlefield and build realistic scenarios into home station training to challenge Soldier and subordinate leaders, prompt the right behaviors, and emphasize these points during the after action review (AAR) process. Throughout daily events, in garrison, training, and deployment, the expectation of the professional performance of the Soldier should be emphasized rather than just in a quarterly or annual training class.

The MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training was designed to involve leaders directly with their Soldiers. The chain teaching and scenarios infused with current unit experiences allowed the leader to discuss with their own Soldiers and subordinates how they would cope with the challenges experienced on the battlefield. Additionally, through open discussion, obstacles can

be identified and addressed, including key equipment, translators, or items that might be required to overcome the barriers. The Commanding General's monitoring of compliance showed the priority of the topic and the method of implementation was designed to model the expected behavior to be enacted through the rest of the deployment.

## WAY AHEAD

Leaders must demonstrate competence, courage, candor, and commitment to point the unit in the right direction and maintain the laws of war, even in the toughest of times. To do this they must be engaged and need to keep their troops informed – of the objectives of the operation, the mission, the actions to be taken, and the Commander's intent. They must conduct AARs which reduce uncertainty and actions that occurred to defuse resentment and tension prior to Soldiers coming into contact with non-combatants. In doing so, leaders show that they understand the combat environment while linking it to the unit's mission and end state to refocus Soldiers on the objectives and remind them of the true enemy.

Leaders also need to be aware of their Soldier's levels of stress and fatigue. The 2007 MHAT report noted that Soldiers averaged only 5.6 hours of sleep per day which is significantly less than what is needed to maintain optimal performance (7-8 hours per night).<sup>35</sup> Fatigue can play a major role in the soundness and effectiveness of a Soldier's decision making. Furthermore, the MHAT reported a decrease in work performance due to stress associated with higher cumulative months of deployment.<sup>36</sup> Commanders should attempt to ensure that all Soldiers are getting necessary rest and that they are actively monitoring units for indicators of elevated stress.

Lastly, the Commander must make ethics a priority throughout the deployment cycle. Violations cannot be tolerated and Soldier actions should be frequently discussed throughout. It should not require a special class but rather it should become routine or habitual. Ethics should


be incorporated throughout all actions of the unit and into all discussions to remind leaders and Soldiers of their responsibilities as professional warriors. As part of this process the leader must directly participate setting the priority of the issue and modeling the expected behavior, otherwise, the interventions are likely to be less effective.

The ethical performance of our Soldiers on the battlefield is of great concern to all leaders. It not only impacts our profession of arms, but individual lapses can have significant tactical, operational, and strategic level impact. Leaders must ensure that they set conditions that promote and uphold the ethical performance of our Soldiers at all levels. As evidenced by the MND-C Battlefield Ethics Program, appropriate ethical performance is not achieved through a specific training program, but instead through integrated ethical training and most importantly *Engaged Leadership*. This will become increasingly paramount in our growing information age.



## TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Stress Behaviors in Combat and Other Operations



NOTE. Adapted from Department of the Army, FM 4-02.51 *Combat and Operational Stress Control* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2006), 1-1 – 1-5.

Figure 2: Overview of the MND-C Battlefield Ethics Training Program

<b>Battlefield Ethics Training Program Overview</b>	
<p><b>Task:</b> Conduct Battlefield Ethics Training</p> <p><b>Format:</b> Video/Slide Directed Discussion in a Leader Led Chain Teaching Format</p> <p><b>Purpose:</b> To promote adherence, protect against unnecessary suffering and collateral damage, and to promote the humane treatment of non-combatants</p> <p><b>Conditions:</b> Leaders are provided a training disk with slides and videos as well as a script of key talking points to cover in each section. Total training time is 60-90 minutes.</p>	
<p><b>INTRODUCTION</b></p> <p>During this section the leader covers the key points of the Army Values, Basic Principles of the Law of War, the Soldier Rules, and the Indicators of Potential Misconduct.</p> <p>Leader also reviews the key data about ongoing battlefield ethical behavior from the Mental Health Assessment Team studies.</p>	
<p><b>TREATMENT OF NON-COMBATANTS</b></p> <p>Scene: Unit searching a village after just having a significant enemy engagement. (Movie Clip from Platoon)</p> <p>Key Discussion Items: Coping with stress, Balancing excessive versus prudent force, rules of engagement, and the impairment of stress induced responses.</p> <p>Warning signs discussed included cursing, destroying property for no reason, or killing of animals.</p>	
<p><b>LOOTING/PILLAGING TREATMENT OF WOUNDED</b></p> <p>Scene: Depicts a civilian providing aid and assistance to soldiers from both sides. (Movie clip from Patriot)</p> <p>Key Discussion Items: Soldiers may feel they earned the right to loot/pillage or commanders may do this to instill fear; however, these short term gains have long term consequences and violations of the laws of war. The Geneva Convention makes clear that WIA are no longer enemy combatants and should be provided medical care.</p>	
<p><b>KILLING NON-COMBATANTS</b></p> <p>Scene 1: Rage attack against villagers. (Platoon) Scene 2: Determining if a child is an enemy combatant. (Black Hawk Down)</p> <p>Key Discussion Items: In most instances, the killing of non-combatants is clearly wrong and illegal and must be dealt with through the military judicial system. It hurts the mission and the unit. However, some instances can be more difficult. Focus is on determining non-combatants versus enemy combatants.</p>	
<p><b>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</b></p> <p>Scene: Soldiers being indecisive about how to engage and interact with possible enemy combatants (Three Kings)</p> <p>Key Discussion Items: Soldiers always have the innate right to protect themselves; however, the rules of engagement provide guidelines for soldiers action. Failure to follow may place the mission at risk. Emphasis is placed on understanding the current rules of engagement for the operational theater.</p>	
<p><b>REPORTING ETHICAL VIOLATIONS</b></p> <p>Scene: Soldiers involved in an ongoing urban battle where a civilian is wounded/killed in the fog of war (Home of the Brave)</p> <p>Key Discussion Items: Data on soldier willingness to report potential violations and attitudes towards investigations. Importance that investigations are not just about determining wrong doing but providing reassurance that the proper steps/actions were taken.</p>	
<p><b>WARNING SIGNS/PROTECTIVE FACTORS/SUMMARY</b></p> <p>Warning Signs/Risk Factors: drugs/alcohol, high combat exposure, unaddressed mental health problems, poor EO climate, failure of expected support, lack of unit cohesion, lack of confidence in unit leadership</p> <p>Protective Factors: Leadership, high unit cohesion, early recognition and addressing of combat operational stress, sleep, rest and refit, effective communication, after action debriefing</p>	

Figure 3: Engaged Leadership's Impact on Ethical Culture




Table 1: Rates of Ethical Behaviors and Willingness to Report Ethical Violations from Soldiers Deployed to Iraq per US Army Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) Reports<sup>7,10</sup>

<b>Ethical Behaviors</b>	<b>MHAT IV (2006) N= 1320</b>	<b>MHAT V (2007) N=2195</b>
Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in their presence	37.1%	33.7%
Damaged and/or destroyed private property when it was not necessary	13.1%	14.2%
Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when it was not necessary	5.8%	6.3%
Members of my unit “modify” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission	10.8%	7.8%
Members of my unit “ignore” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission	6.0%	4.5%
<b>Reporting Ethical Violations</b>	<b>MHAT IV (2006)</b>	<b>MHAT V (2007)</b>
I would report a unit member for the mistreatment of a non-combatant	36.2%	33.6%
I would report a unit member for injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant	44.0%	40.6%
I would report a unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property	31.1%	29.9%
I would report a unit member for stealing from a non-combatant	37.8%	34.1%
I would report a unit member for violating the Rules of Engagement	36.3%	35.4%
I would report a unit member for not following General Orders	36.6%	34.8%

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